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Public Argument as Self-Preservation: A
Critique of Argumentation Theory as a
Democratic Practice
Kristen E. Hoerl, University o/Texas at Austin
In his keynote address at the 1995 Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation, Frans van Eemeren stated that because "argumentative
discussion is the main tool for managing democratic processes," argumentation
should be "valued as the elixir of life of participatory democracy" (Hicks and
Langsdorf, 1999, p. 139). Insofar as van Eemeren conceived democracy as a
process that involves widespread participation in the management of civic
affairs, he suggested that the study of argumentation is a public good. Although
I also seek to advance the goals of participatory democracy, I urge scholars to
reconsider the role of argumentation theory in civic life. Several concepts
prevalent within argumentation scholarship invoke norms foundational to the
goals of participatory democracy, but they do not always characterize the
deliberation that emerges in response to public controversy. Specifically, several
instances of public controversy covered by news media do not exemplify selfrisking argument in which people reason collaboratively ahout issues of
co=on concern. lhis paper explores two instances of public controversy that
emerged in the aftermath of the attacks against the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11 , 200 I, and concludes by advocating an agenda for
argumentation scholarship that might provide further understanding of the praxis
of contemporary arguments and promote egalitarian forms of deliberation for
actually existing publics.
Self-Risk as the Condition for Democratic Argument
Models of democratic deliberation have sought to equalize power
relationships that structure argumentative practice hy calling for self-risking
argument. Self-risking argument is characterized by mutual engagement, respect
for all persons, and the ability to transform one's own perspective by
considering the perspectives of interlocutors. (See Natanson, 1965; Ebninger,
1970, Goodnight, 1993 ; and Foss & Griffin, 1995.) Goodnight (1993) advocates
a "responsible rhetoric" that can only be achieved "if there is enough confidence
for at least two parties to take the risk of being wrong when acting together" and
when "a mutual respect. .. emerges from the co=unicative relationship between
interlocutors" (pp. 338-339). Such characteristics distinguish ethical argument
from oppressive forms of co=unication in which people preserve their selves
and their perspectives. By allowing for the possibility that one's own perspective
may change through the process of bilateral co=unication, self-risking
argument ostensibly equalizes the power relations between arguers and those

167
they seek to influence. Thus, the concept of self-risk is central to notions of
public argument as a democratic practice.

Public Controversy in the News Media
Although the scholarship on self-risk provides a useful framework for
thinking about the norms that constitute democratic deliberation, several
instances of public deliberation illustrate the limitations of self-risk for
understanding public controversy. This paper focuses on two instances of
deliberation that emerged in news media in the wake of the tragedies on
September 11, 2001. The first controversy appeared in the editorial pages of the
Houston Chronicle between September 14,2001 , and January 20, 2002. The
second controversy appeared in national broadcast news coverage of statements
made on the television talk show, " Politically Incorrect" on September 17,2001.
Although this paper examines news media as a site of public
controversy, it does not suggest that news media are necessarily representative
of the public. Habermas (1962) described how technical and marketplace
models of public life have subsumed considerations of public concerns during
the last half of the 20th century. His critique of the economic imperatives driving
the production of mass media highlighted the commercial function of the mass
media; thus, he suggested that we must be careful about attributing public
concerns with the news media; indeed, news media may be interested in a much
narrower audience.!
In order to avoid collapsing the public with news media, this paper
draws a distinction between public controversy and the public sphere. Most
people living in late-capitalist democracies learn most, ifnot all of their
information about public policy issues from the commercial news media even
though a limited range of voices may gain a hearing within such media. As they
represent clashes of interest regarding these issues, commercial news media
become a site for identifying public controversy. Thus, the extent to which news
mediated controversies reflect characteristics of self-risking argument may
indicate the scope of democracy' s presence in our lives.

Self-Preservation: Public Controversy in the Wake of September 11
On September 11, 2001 , and for months thereafter, news media
coverage put the attacks on the World Trade Center on the public agenda. Three
days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Houston
Chronicle published an editorial written by Robert Jensen, a journalism
professor at The University of Texas at Austin. Jensen (200 I) implicated the
role of United States' foreign policy in the attacks on September II and argued
that the attacks were no more reprehensible than atrocities committed by the
United States against countries in Central America, the Middle-East, and Asia (p.
A27). This argument provoked widespread outcry. Editor of the Houston
Chronicle David Langworthy (2002) told readers that his office received letters
suggesting "virtual unanimity in opposition to Jensen' s comparison of past U.S.
government actions with those of the 9-11 terrorists" (p. I) . Although
Langworthy indicated that many people challenged Jensen's ideas, most of the
letters printed in the Houston Chronicle that objected to Jensen's article did not
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respond to Jensen's argument; instead, controversy emerged over whether
Jensen should have presented his argument in a public forum at all.
One letter to the editor ofthe Houston Chronicle claimed that Jensen's
"extreme views should not be printed" while "the nation" mourned the attacks of
September II (Swinney, 2001 , p. A39). On September 19, Larry Faulkner,
President of The University of Texas at Austin, also wrote a letter to the
Houston Chronicle in response to Jensen's editorial. Even though he personally
disagreed with Jensen' s argument, Faulkner suggested that the public ought to
respect Jensen's right to express his opinion because Jensen spoke "under the
protection of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution" (p. A39). Faulkner
then told readers that Jensen had become " a fountain of undiluted foolishness on
issues of public policy" and instructed students to become "skilled at
recognizing and discounting" arguments similar to Jensen's (2001 , p. A39).
Faulkner's condemnation of Jensen repudiated the ideals of mutual
consideration of the interlocutors' perspective and of respect for alternative
viewpoints. By urging students to eschew Jensen's argument, Faulker also
indicated that self-risk should not be the norm for public argument; nor should it
be a norm within higher education. Thus, his comments suggested that the ideal
of free speech does not necessarily promote mutual understanding and common
ground necessary for democratic deliberation.
The day before Faulkner's response to Jensen appeared in the Houston
Chronicle, a similar controversy emerged following Bill Maher's comments
during his late-night talk show program, "Politically Incorrecf'. On September
17, 2001 , Maher objected to President Bush's statement that the terrorists who
flew planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon demonstrated
cowardice. Maher told audiences, " Staying in the airplane when it hits the
building -- say what you want about it, it' s not cowardly." Maher then added
that the United States ' military strategies, such as " lobbing cruise missiles from
2,000 miles away" did represent cowardice.
Maher's comments generated irate responses from public figures and
corporate sponsors for ABC. On September 20, hosts of the national television
morning news program The Early Show discussed Maher' s comments. Bryant
Gumbel (Gumbel & Clayson, 2001) concluded that Maher must not have meant
for his comments to sound as provocative as they had been received. "About
every individual who sits in--in this kind of position. You're always afraid that
you are going to say something that you really didn' t mean." Gumbel's
suggestion that Maher' s offensive statements were not intentional indicated that
he thought the argument was, indeed, offensive and not worthy of consideration.
Thus, Gumbel did not risk the possibility that Maher might have a legitimate
argument.
Other news anchors did not attempt to find any justification for
Maher' s comments. During her discussion with Gumbel, Jane Clayson remarked,
"Open mouth, insert large feet." Mark McEwen, the program' s meteorologist,
then spoke to an imagined Maher: " keep your big mouth shut." Clayson and
McEwen then congratulated Sears and Federal Express for pulling their
advertising from ABC following Maher's commentary. Clayson's and
McEwen's support for Sears' and Federal Express' withdrawal of financial
support for ABC indicated that the public should not only disregard Maher's
provocative comments but should revoke his nationwide platform to express his
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ideas. Instead of discrediting Maher's arguments on the basis of his reasoning,
Clayson and McEwen suggested that Maher shouldn't speak at all.
The individuals who objected to Jensen and Maher presumed that their
own responses did constitute reasonable discourse, whereas Jensen and Maher
exemplified incorrigible speech. Thus, these individuals suggested that they did
not need to consider perspectives that challenged prevailing attitudes about
United States' foreign policy. These brief case studies indicate that self-risk is
not a prevailing norm in deliberation about public policies within news media
coverage. Although journalistic norms include the presentation of multiple
points of view, critics of Jensen and Maher suggested that the public may not be
engaged in consideration of multiple points of view; nor do these individuals
express respect for their interlocutors. Furthermore, comments espousing
individuals' removal from public consideration suggest that the norm of
presenting multiple perspectives is in eclipse. Instead of representing self-risking
argument, these examples characterized public controversy as a self-preserving

exercise.
Critical Argumentation, an Exploration of Self-Preserving Discourse
Although self-risk does not necessarily describe public argument, my
use of this concept to evaluate public controversies following September II
suggests that the concept of self-risk in argumentation scholarship should not be
abandoned altogether. Like notion of the public sphere, self-risk may be best
regarded as a "normative, yet counter-factual ideal" (Fraser, 1997, p. 71). As a
set of ideal conditions for enabling democratic deliberation, the concept may be
a useful critical tool for assessing public controversies . The notion of self-risk in
argument establishes an ideal to consider the possibilities of and the constraints
that limit participatory democracy in contemporary societies.
Alternatively, scholarship interested in an ethical ideal cannot rest with
identifying argument's absences; it must also explore the constraints that limit
public deliberation. To understand why arguers preserve their initial
perspectives during their engagement in public controversy, we need to
determine what factors constrain the possibilities of self-risking argument in
moments when the rights to express one' s opinion is held as a public good.
A further examination of the contexts surrounding public controversy
in the wake of September 11 indicates that perceptions of the differential status
of interlocutors motivated self-preservation as an argumentative strategy during
public controversy. Several letters to the editor of the Houston Chronicle
suggested that they valued Faulkner' s input because his identity was
consubstantial with the University. Frank Miller (2000) stated, "My anger at the
printing of Robert Jensen's Outlook article was soothed somewhat by the
president of the University of Texas' gratifying response. I hope Jensen is
removed from his position of inflicting his views on his captive audience" (p.
A35). Miller drew attention to the positions of power that structure relationships
within the university and suggested that Faulkner's repudiation of Jensen was
significant because Faulkner held a position of authority over Jensen.
Miller also indicated that Faulkner's authority was important because
Jensen also held a powerful position at the University. The idea that students are
"held captive" by their professors implied that students' thoughts are determined
by their professors' position. Miller's appeal to Faulkner to terminate Jensen's
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job, as well as Miller's concern for coercive argument in higher education,
emphasized how relations of status and hierarchy may constrain what may be
said within the institutions in which individuals live and work. Thus, he
indicated that individuals engage in self-preserving arguments when the status of
interlocutors looms preeminently in the context of their deliberation. As Miller
suggested, self-risk is not a part of public argument when interlocutors perceive
a world in which unilateral influence predominates. Instead, interlocutors protect
themselves against the arguments that challenge their notions of "common
sense."
Sears and Federal Express' responses to B ill Maher's comments
indicated why considerations of power constrain self-risk in public argument.
By pulling their ads from ABC, Sears and Federal Express demonstrated that
they did not think Maher's commentary provided a suitable climate for
consumers. Predictably, the network cancelled Maher's program the following
summer. Sears ' and Federal Express ' decision to drop their accounts with ABC
highlighted the economic imperatives of the commercial broadcast media. Their
decision suggested that the financial imperatives of the institutions that people
live and work within constrain how people may deliberate with one another.
President Faulkner also faced institutional pressure that delimited what
he could say in response to Jensen' s editorial. Raising money from private
donors and alumni is one of Faulkner's primary responsibilities. This role has
become increasingly important as state legislatures have constricted fimding for
public universities while student enrollments have grown during the past
(Hanley, 1996, p. 67). The imperative for Faulkner to maintain a favorable
relationship with university sponsors provides a plausible explanation for the
self-preservation he employed in response to Jensen's editorial. Given
Houston's proximity to Austin, many Houston Chronicle readers are likely to be
alumni, donors, or parents of students attending the university. By printing his
response in Houston's local newspaper, Faulkner directed his response to a
constituency who may have objected to Jensen's critique of United States'
foreign policy. Faulkner was not interested in engaging an audience sympathetic
with Jensen; instead, he sought to assuage Houston Chronicle readers who found
Jensen's critique appalling. He did not encourage them to consider the merits of
Jensen's argument because he sought to maintain their financial support.
Public deliberation over Jensen's and Maher's critique of United
States' foreign policy elucidated the constraints on self-risk within public
argument. Faulkner did not engage in self-risk following Jensen's editorial
because he spoke for the university in a role that required him to raise fimds
from wealthy donors. Likewise, the hosts of The Early Show and ABC's
executive producers had to maintain a climate amenable to corporate sponsors.
Thus, they could not engage in controversial ideas that might offend potential
consumers. These case studies indicate that an arguer's role within prevaiJing
institutions has implications for his or her ability to foster open deliberation,
even within those organizations of higher education and journalism that promote
free speech as a hallmark of a democratic society.
Public Argument: An Oxymoron?
Institutional constraints placed upon arguers suggest that arguers are
less likely to engage in self-risk when the stakes of such risk include more than
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just one's perception of truth or justice; people are less likely to risk the
possibility that their assumptions may be wrong when doing so has implications
for their livelihoods and for the financial support necessary for the maintenance
of the institutions that they represent. The preceding case studies also indicate
that individuals are more likely to engage in self-preserving forms of argument
when institutional goals are at stake. Indeed, it appears that an arguer's
institutional affiliation often provides the exigency for engaging public
controversy; therefore, the goals of the institution determine what they may say.
Individuals who represent not only themselves, but the institutions that
legitirrllze them as authoritative spokespersons, cannot risk the institution' s
identity because institutions do not have the flexibility that individuals have.
The constraints to self-risk in public controversy have implications for
how we think about publics and publicity. Several critics of Jensen and Maher
suggested that the ideal of open deliberation is a mirage; despite references to
free speech as an inherent public good, these people preserved their perspectives
and highlighted the role that power plays in the decision-making process.
Arguments meeting the conditions for deliberative democracy also failed to
materialize in public discourse because interlocutors didn' t necessarily engage
in public controversy for public purposes. My analysis of President Faulkner' s
response to Professor Jensen's editorial suggests that many people access
channels of public argument, such as co=ercial news media., to reach a much
narrower audience. It also indicates that representatives oflarger institutions
seek a hearing from publicly accessible channels for private, or institutional
goals. Thus, the consequences of argument for broader publics may not be of
central concern for arguers engaged in public controversy.
These observations indicate that scholarship theorizing self-risk and
co=on ground does not adequately explain what happens when people engage
in public controversy. Argumentation scholars interested in the possibilities and
limitations of deliberative democracy need to tum their attention away from
ideal methods of democratic argument to understand the praxis of prevailing
arguments about public issues. More importantly, scholarship should begin to
develop theories that explain why argument fails to represent the ideals of
deliberative democracy. Put differently, scholars need to explore the conditions
that sustain contemporary methods of argument and attend to issues that shape
contemporary argument, such as audiences and interests that extract concerns
about the public good from public controversies. As scholars interested in
promoting deliberative democracy, we need to acknowledge the factors that
constrain self-risk so that we may begin theorizing what we might do to
overcome them. Through such scholarship, we may also provide our students
with useful analytics for engaging their social worlds, not only as professionals,
but as public citizens.
Note
'Additional scholarship explaining bow marketplace models of public life have proliferated with the
commercialization of the mass media may be found in Oscar H. Gandy, 'Dividing Practices:
Segmentation and Targeting in the Emerging Public Sphere," in Mediated Politics: Communication
in the Future of Democracy. ed. W. Lance Bennett & Robert Entman (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 141-159; and Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy:
Communication PolitiCS in Dubious Times (New York: The New Press, 1999).
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